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This paper examines the distributional and behavioral effects of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).
We chart the growth of the program over time, and argue several expansions show that real responses
to taxes are important.  We use tax data to show the distribution of benefits by income and family
size, and examine the impacts of hypothetical reforms (expansions and contractions) to the credit.
Finally, we calculate the efficiency effects of marginal changes to EITC parameters.  Targeting the
EITC to lower-income families by raising the phase-out rate generates a welfare loss for single mothers,
primarily because of the disincentive to enter the labor market and not the traditional hours-of-work
distortion.
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1Edwin Amenta (1998), review of The Hidden Welfare State: Tax Expenditures  and Social Policy in the United 

































                                                 
2 A "qualifying child" for the EITC must be under age 19 (or 24 if a full‐time student) or permanently disabled and residing with 
















































































































































                                                 
5 Note that this is a measure of the tax benefits per state not state tax burdens. The burden is faced by all taxpayers, not just 
state residents.


















(1 ) S w τ + where  S τ  is the subsidy rate (34 percent for one child, 40 percent for two or more). In the flat 
region of the credit (BC), the taxpayer’s budget constraint is shifted out an amount equal to the 
maximum credit and her gross (and net of tax) hourly wage is w.  Each dollar earned in the phase‐out 
region of the EITC (CD) reduces the credit by a phase‐out rate of  p τ  (about 21 percent) leading to a net 

















































































































































                                                 
7 To offset the marriage penalty associated with the EITC, EGGTRA expanded the size of the flat credit for married 


















































































































































                                                 
12 This policy assumes no change to the credit for the childless.   
















































































































































                                                 
14 Saez shows that the optimal program is instead a classical Negative Income Tax program, with a substantial income 
guarantee that is phased out a high rate. 
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Source: 2004 SOI Public Use File
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Targeted reform (rev neutral)





Tax year Phase-in rate Maximum Credit Phase-out rate
Beginning 
Income Ending Income
1975–78 10 4,000 400 10 4,000 8,000
1979–84 10 5,000 500 12.5 6,000 10,000
1985–86 14 5,000 550 12.22 6,500 11,000
1987 14 6,080 851 10 6,920 15,432
1988 14 6,240 874 10 9,840 18,576
1989 14 6,500 910 10 10,240 19,340
1990 14 6,810 953 10 10,730 20,264
1991 One child 16.7 7,140 1,192 11.93 11,250 21,250
Two children 17.3 7,140 1,235 12.36 11,250 21,250
1992 One child 17.6 7,520 1,324 12.57 11,840 22,370
Two children 18.4 7,520 1,384 13.14 11,840 22,370
1993 One child 18.5 7,750 1,434 13.21 12,200 23,050
Two children 19.5 7,750 1,511 13.93 12,200 23,050
1994 No children 7.65 4,000 306 7.65 5,000 9,000
One child 26.3 7,750 2,038 15.98 11,000 23,755
Two children 30 8,425 2,528 17.68 11,000 25,296
1995 No children 7.65 4,100 314 7.65 5,130 9,230
One child 34 6,160 2,094 15.98 11,290 24,396
Two children 36 8,640 3,110 20.22 11,290 26,673
1996 No children 7.65 4,220 323 7.65 5,280 9,500
One child 34 6,330 2,152 15.98 11,610 25,078
Two children 40 8,890 3,556 21.06 11,610 28,495
1997 No children 7.65 4,340 332 7.65 5,430 9,770
One child 34 6,500 2,210 15.98 11,930 25,750
Two children 40 9,140 3,656 21.06 11,930 29,290
1998 No children 7.65 4,460 341 7.65 5,570 10,030
One child 34 6,680 2,271 15.98 12,260 26,473
Two children 40 9,390 3,756 21.06 12,260 30,095
1999 No children 7.65 4,530 347 7.65 5,670 10,200
One child 34 6,800 2,312 15.98 12,460 26,928
Two children 40 9,540 3,816 21.06 12,460 30,580
2000 No children 7.65 4,610 353 7.65 5,770 10,380
One child 34 6,920 2,353 15.98 12,690 27,413
Two children 40 9,720 3,888 21.06 12,690 31,152
2001 No children 7.65 4,760 364 7.65 5,950 10,710
One child 34 7,140 2,428 15.98 13,090 28,281
Two children 40 10,020 4,008 21.06 13,090 32,121
2002 No children 7.65 4,910 376 7.65 6,150 11,060
One child 34 7,370 2,506 15.98 13,520 29,201
Two children 40 10,350 4,140 21.06 13,520 33,178
2003 No children 7.65 4,990 382 7.65 6,240 11,230
One child 34 7,490 2,547 15.98 13,730 29,666
Two children 40 10,510 4,204 21.06 13,730 33,692
2004 No children 7.65 5,100 390 7.65 6,390 11,490
One child 34 7,660 2,604 15.98 14,040 30,338
Two children 40 10,750 4,300 21.06 14,040 34,458
2005 No children 7.65 5,220 399 7.65 6,530 11,750
One child 34 7,830 2,662 15.98 14,370 31,030
Two children 40 11,000 4,400 21.06 14,370 35,263
2006 No children 7.65 5,380 412 7.65 6,740 12,120
One child 34 8,080 2,747 15.98 14,810 32,001
Two children 40 11,340 4,536 21.06 14,810 36,348
2007 No children 7.65 5,590 428 7.65 7,000 12,590
One child 34 8,390 2,853 15.98 15,390 33,241
Two children 40 11,790 4,716 21.06 15,390 37,783
Phaseout range Minimum 













All 22.1 $40.1 $1,806
Number of EITC Qualifying Children
1 child 8.4 38% $14.4 36% $1,715
2+ children 9.2 42% $24.7 62% $2,693
No Children 4.6 21% $1.0 3% $218
Filing Status
Head of Household 11.7 53% $26.1 65% $2,230
Joint Return 5.1 23% $10.0 25% $1,953
Single 5.3 24% $3.9 10% $742
EITC Range 
Phase In 5.9 27% $9.1 23% $1,544
Flat 4.2 19% $11.7 29% $2,817































All 130.9 22.1 $40.1 $7,099.3 100.0% 100.0% $1,811 $306 0.6%
Cash Income Decile
0‐10% (excluding negative) 11.9 3.0 $2.0 $33.0 13.6% 4.9% $647 $165 5.9%
10‐20% 13.2 5.9 $9.9 $108.9 26.5% 24.6% $1,685 $747 9.1%
20‐30% 13.2 4.4 $13.8 $186.5 20.0% 34.5% $3,127 $1,047 7.4%
30‐40% 13.2 4.1 $9.6 $267.4 18.7% 23.9% $2,309 $723 3.6%
40‐50% 13.2 3.9 $4.5 $364.3 17.6% 11.2% $1,151 $339 1.2%
50‐60% 13.2 0.8 $0.4 $480.1 3.5% 0.9% $463 $27 0.1%
60‐70% 13.2 0.0 $0.0 $622.6 0.1% 0.1% $884 $2 0.0%
70‐80% 13.2 0.0 $0.0 $810.5 0.0% 0.0% $1,860 $0 0.0%
80‐90% 13.2 0.0 $0.0 $1,100.6 0.0% 0.0% $481 $0 0.0%
90‐100% 13.2 0.0 $0.0 $3,125.5 0.0% 0.0% $0 $0 0.0%
Cash Income Bracket
Less than 0 0.0 0.0 $0.0 $0.0 0.0% 0.0% $0 $0 0.0%
0‐2500 5.1 1.0 $0.3 $6.7 0.8% 0.8% $331 $64 4.9%
2500‐5000 6.0 1.8 $1.4 $22.4 3.4% 3.4% $764 $229 6.1%
5000‐7500 5.6 2.1 $2.8 $34.9 6.9% 6.9% $1,328 $495 7.9%
7500‐1000 5.8 2.7 $4.6 $50.7 11.5% 11.5% $1,726 $793 9.1%
10000‐12500 5.5 2.5 $6.0 $62.3 15.0% 15.0% $2,417 $1,084 9.6%
12500‐15000 5.6 1.8 $5.9 $76.6 14.8% 14.8% $3,308 $1,067 7.8%
15000‐17500 5.6 1.7 $5.4 $90.1 13.4% 13.4% $3,090 $968 6.0%
17500‐20000 5.5 1.6 $4.1 $102.5 10.1% 10.1% $2,576 $744 4.0%
20000‐22500 4.9 1.7 $3.6 $104.5 8.9% 8.9% $2,158 $729 3.4%
22500‐25000 4.5 1.5 $2.6 $105.7 6.4% 6.4% $1,698 $576 2.4%
25000‐27500 4.1 1.3 $1.7 $107.9 4.3% 4.3% $1,271 $415 1.6%
27500‐30000 3.9 1.2 $1.0 $112.5 2.5% 2.5% $861 $260 0.9%
30000‐32500 4.0 0.7 $0.5 $124.5 1.2% 1.2% $706 $120 0.4%





















0 0.08 5,100 390 6,390 0.0765 11,490              
1 0.34 7,660 2,604 14,040 0.1598 30,338              
2+ 0.40 10,750 4,300 14,040 0.2106 34,458              
1 0.46 7,660 3,487 14,040 0.1598 35,861              
2+ 0.54 10,750 5,754 14,040 0.2106 41,362              
0 0.153 5,720 780 10,900 0.1530 15,998              
1 0.34 7,660 2,604 14,040 0.0533 62,896              
2+ 0.40 10,750 4,300 14,040 0.0702 75,294              
1 0.24 7,660 1,811 14,040 0.0533 48,017              
2+ 0.28 10,750 2,988 14,040 0.0702 56,604              
1 0.34 7,660 2,604 14,040 0.4794 19,472              
2+ 0.40 10,750 4,300 14,040 0.6318 20,846              
1 0.46 7,660 3,487 14,040 0.4794 21,314              
2+ 0.54 10,750 5,754 14,040 0.6318 23,147              
1 0.34 7,660 2,604 14,040 0.1498 31,423              
2+ 0.40 10,750 4,300 14,040 0.2006 35,476              
1 0.34 7,660 2,604 14,040 0.1698 29,376              
2+ 0.40 10,750 4,300 14,040 0.2206 33,532               
1 0.33 7,660 2,528 14,040 0.1598 29,859               
2+ 0.39 10,750 4,193 14,040 0.2106 33,947               
1 0.35 7,660 2,681 14,040 0.1598 30,817               



































Number of EITC Recipients (millions) 22.9 25.4 26.2 35.5 30.2 16.1 17.5
Total Tax Cost (billions) $40.1 $60.0 $42.9 $67.1 $39.1 $26.5 $38.4
Percent Distribution of Total Tax Cost by
Number of EITC Qualifying Children
1 child 34.0% 34.2% 31.8% 33.1% 33.3% 35.0% 35.0%
2+ children 54.2% 55.3% 50.8% 58.8% 56.4% 52.1% 50.7%
No Children 11.8% 10.5% 17.4% 8.1% 10.2% 12.9% 14.2%
Marital Status
Head of Household 65.2% 65.4% 61.2% 56.7% 60.8% 66.7% 67.4%
Joint Return 24.8% 25.8% 23.9% 36.6% 30.7% 19.9% 20.6%
Single 10.0% 8.8% 14.9% 6.7% 8.5% 13.4% 12.0%
EITC Range
None 5.5% 5.5% 3.1% 4.6% 5.0% 4.6% 4.9%
Phase In 19.9% 17.8% 20.3% 12.0% 14.7% 30.0% 27.6%
Flat 25.1% 22.5% 29.6% 15.2% 18.2% 37.5% 34.6%
Phase Out 49.4% 52.1% 43.1% 45.8% 50.3% 27.9% 32.8%
Cash Income Decile
0‐10% 6.6% 5.7% 7.4% 4.0% 5.2% 9.9% 8.8%
10‐20% 27.1% 24.1% 28.6% 16.3% 19.9% 40.9% 37.5%
20‐30% 33.2% 30.1% 32.8% 20.7% 24.5% 43.6% 42.4%
30‐40% 22.7% 22.9% 21.4% 18.7% 20.9% 5.1% 10.7%
40‐50% 9.4% 13.3% 8.9% 15.3% 15.5% 0.4% 0.4%
50‐60% 0.8% 3.6% 0.8% 12.0% 9.9% 0.2% 0.2%
60‐70% 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 8.8% 4.0% 0.0% 0.0%
70‐80% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.0% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0%
80‐90% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
























Head of Household ‐10.2% ‐4.7 ‐0.1 ‐2.4 2.2 2.0 ‐1.7
Joint Return 4.7% ‐0.5 0.0 ‐0.7 0.1 0.4 0.1
Single 4.6% ‐0.2 ‐0.6 0.0 0.2 0.1 ‐0.1
EITC Range
Not eligible 7.6% ‐0.1 0.1 ‐0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0
Phase In ‐10.1% ‐3.0 ‐1.5 0.0 2.6 0.0 ‐3.0
Flat ‐15.5% ‐4.9 ‐1.1 ‐0.1 4.4 0.2 ‐4.7
Phase Out ‐6.6% ‐2.6 ‐0.2 ‐2.0 0.5 1.9 0.5
Newly eligible (phase‐out) ‐1.3 ‐0.7 ‐2.6 ‐1.5 ‐‐
Newly ineligible (phase‐out) ‐‐ ‐‐ 4.3 3.2
Cash Income Decile
0‐10% ‐4.9% ‐1.4 ‐1.2 ‐0.6 1.0 0.0 ‐1.4
10‐20% ‐8.5% ‐3.2 ‐1.3 ‐0.1 2.7 0.0 ‐3.1
20‐30% ‐6.3% ‐2.5 ‐0.4 ‐0.2 2.1 0.9 ‐1.6
30‐40% ‐1.7% ‐1.7 0.0 ‐1.2 0.4 2.9 1.8
40‐50% 2.4% ‐1.2 0.0 ‐1.8 ‐0.6 1.1 1.1
50‐60% 5.0% ‐0.4 0.0 ‐1.6 ‐0.7 0.1 0.1
60‐70% 6.5% 0.0 0.0 ‐1.0 ‐0.3 0.0 0.0
70‐80% 7.9% 0.0 0.0 ‐0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
80‐90% 9.5% 0.0 0.0 ‐0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
90‐100% 14.8% 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Marginal Tax Rate by
Marital Status
Head of Household 7.5% ‐0.5 0.1 ‐3.1 ‐1.8 1.2 2.4
Joint Return 16.8% 0.4 0.0 0.3 ‐0.1 ‐0.1 0.2
Single 12.1% ‐0.1 0.3 ‐0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0
EITC Range
Not eligible 18.0% 0.0 0.0 ‐0.2 ‐0.1 0.0 0.1
Phase In ‐8.8% ‐2.6 ‐0.9 0.0 2.7 0.1 ‐2.5
Flat ‐4.9% ‐0.2 ‐0.7 0.0 0.8 2.1 1.3
Phase Out 12.9% 0.1 0.3 ‐5.7 ‐5.6 8.7 11.0
Newly eligible (phase‐out) 14.8 5.6 5.8 5.5 ‐‐
Newly ineligible (phase‐out) ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐ 15.3 ‐14.9
Cash Income Decile
0‐10% ‐4.0% ‐1.4 ‐1.0 0.0 1.2 0.0 ‐1.4
10‐20% ‐1.1% ‐1.7 ‐0.4 ‐0.1 2.0 0.1 ‐1.7
20‐30% 5.3% 0.1 3.2 ‐2.1 ‐2.0 6.9 6.9
30‐40% 13.7% 0.0 0.0 ‐4.0 ‐3.9 0.8 6.6
40‐50% 16.8% 0.5 0.1 ‐3.2 ‐3.2 ‐5.0 ‐4.9
50‐60% 16.4% 2.9 0.1 0.9 0.9 ‐0.9 ‐0.8
60‐70% 18.6% 0.2 0.0 2.0 1.6 ‐0.1 ‐0.1
70‐80% 18.8% 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.2 0.0 0.0
80‐90% 21.3% 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 ‐0.1 ‐0.1




























rate    
A. Marginal Reform 1: 2004 EITC with lower phase-out rate 
Total Eligible for EITC    13.268 0.268  -0.002 0.288 -0.003   
           
By EITC Region           
Phase In    2.421  0.164 0.000  0.023 0.000   
Flat   2.783  0.169  0.000 0.187  0.000   
Phase Out    7.852  0.331  -0.003 0.405 -0.007   
Newly Eligible     0.212  0.401  -0.002 0.323  0.107   
B. Marginal Reform 2: 2004 EITC with higher phase-out rate 
Overall Eligibles    12.817 0.270 0.002  0.293 0.002   
              
By EITC Region           
Phase In    2.421  0.164 0.000  0.023 0.000   
Flat   2.783  0.169  0.000 0.187  0.000   
Phase Out    7.613  0.329 0.003  0.404 0.008   
Newly Ineligible      0.24 0.394 0.002  0.442  -0.113   
C. Marginal Reform 3: 2004 EITC with lower subsidy rate 
Total Eligible for EITC    12.938 0.268 0.006  0.290 0.0002   
           
By EITC Region           
Phase In    2.421  0.164 0.009  0.023 0.009   
Flat   2.783  0.169  0.007 0.187  0.000   
Phase Out    7.734  0.330 0.004  0.405  -0.001   
Newly Ineligible     0.118 0.398 0.001  0.434  -0.103   
D. Marginal Reform 4: 2004 EITC with higher subsidy rate 
Overall Eligibles    13.174 0.267  -0.006  0.288 0.000    
           
By EITC Region           
Phase In    2.421  0.164  -0.009 0.023 -0.009   
Flat   2.783  0.169  -0.007 0.187  0.000   
Phase Out    7.852  0.331 -0.004 0.405  0.001   
Newly Eligible     0.118 0.400  -0.001  0.317 0.099   









  Efficiency gains    
  
Elasticity 





         (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     (5) 
A. Marginal Reform 1: 2004 EITC with lower phase-out rate 
   
Low  ε=0, η=0.2   0.000    0.019   0.019   0.043    1.120 
                      
Middle   ε=0.1, η=0.3   0.022    0.029   0.050   0.086    1.391 
                      
High  ε=0.2, η=0.4   0.043    0.039   0.082   0.129    1.834 
                      
Middle [Reversed]  ε=0.3, η=0.1   0.065    0.010   0.074   0.086    1.706 
                      
B. Marginal Reform 2: 2004 EITC with higher phase-out rate 
 
Low  ε=0, η=0.2   0.000  -0.018   -0.018    0.100    1.118 
                      
Middle  ε=0.1, η=0.3   0.050  -0.026   0.023    0.199    0.877 
                        
High  ε=0.2, η=0.4   0.100  -0.035   0.064    0.299    0.721 
                      
Middle [Reversed]  ε=0.3, η=0.1   0.149  -0.009   0.140    0.199    0.542 
                      
C: Marginal Reform 3: 2004 EITC with lower subsidy rate   
                  
Low  ε=0, η=0.2   0.000  -0.024   -0.024    0.129    1.080 
                      
Middle   ε=0.1, η=0.3   0.065  -0.035   0.029    0.258    0.916 
                      
High  ε=0.2, η=0.4   0.129  -0.047   0.082    0.388    0.796 
                      
Middle [Reversed]  ε=0.3, η=0.1   0.194  -0.012   0.182    0.258    0.637 
                      
D. Marginal Reform 4: 2004 EITC with higher subsidy rate 
                  
Low  ε=0, η=0.2   0.000  0.024   0.024   -0.021   1.080 
                      
Middle  ε=0.1, η=0.3    -0.011   0.036   0.026   -0.043   1.086 
                      
High  ε=0.2, η=0.4    -0.021   0.049   0.027   -0.064   1.091 
                      
Middle [Reversed]  ε=0.3, η=0.1    -0.032   0.012   -0.020   -0.043   0.943 
                                   
                      
Source: Authors’ tabulations of the 2005 March CPS. 
Note: The participation elasticity is given by η and the compensated hours of work elasticity is given by ε. The welfare gain is 
measured in percentage of wage income. The total welfare gain is calculated as the sum of the intensive and extensive gains. 
The “traditional” welfare gain is calculated assuming that the total labor supply elasticity is entirely along the intensive margin. 
The welfare gain per dollar spent equals RTB/(RTB−EG) where EG is the efficiency gain and RTB is the reduction in tax burden.  